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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






ANTWAN L. RICHARDSON, 




JOSEPH F. HARTYE; BRADLEY A. WINNICK; JOHN R. CANAVAN; DAUPHIN 
COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE; DAUPHIN COUNTY DISTRICT 
ATTORNEYS OFFICE; JUDGE DEBORAH E. CURCILLO; FRANCIS T. CHARDO 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-19-cv-02132) 
District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 10, 2021 
 
Before:   MCKEE, GREENAWAY, JR., and PORTER, Circuit Judges 
 








* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
Appellant Antwan Richardson, an inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 
appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his civil rights complaint.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I. 
 In December 2019, Richardson filed a complaint against numerous defendants 
involved in his state court criminal proceedings, including his public defender, the district 
attorney, several police officers, and the trial judge.  A United States Magistrate Judge 
screened Richardson’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), dismissed the 
complaint for failure to state a claim, and granted Richardson leave to file an amended 
complaint.  Richardson then filed an amended complaint, omitting the police officer 
defendants.  Neither complaint identified a precise cause of action but the Magistrate 
Judge liberally construed Richardson to have alleged 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims stemming 
from his criminal prosecution and conviction.  Specifically, Richardson alleged 
constitutional violations based on claims of 1) malicious prosecution; 2) an improper 
competency evaluation; 3) improper delay in being brought to trial; 4) selective 
prosecution; and 5) ineffective assistance of counsel.  Richardson seeks damages and 
equitable relief. 
 The Magistrate Judge screened the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B) and recommended dismissal of the complaint without further leave to 
amend.  The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report over Richardson’s 




We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Richardson’s claims 
under § 1915(e)(2).  See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 2020).  To avoid 
dismissal for failure to state a claim, a civil complaint must set out “sufficient factual 
matter” to show that its claims are facially plausible.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 678 (2009).  Construing Richardson’s complaint liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), we accept all factual allegations in the complaint as 
true and view those facts in the light most favorable to Richardson, Fleisher v. Standard 
Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012).  We may summarily affirm if the appeal fails 
to present a substantial question.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 
2011) (per curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
III. 
We agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Richardson’s claims for 
substantially the reasons stated in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.  
First, Richardson’s claims against Judge Curcillo are barred by absolute immunity.  See 
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1978) (explaining that judges are not civilly 
liable for judicial acts); Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) 
(“A judicial officer in the performance of his duties has absolute immunity from suit and 
will not be liable for his judicial acts.”).  Although Richardson disagreed with Judge 
Curcillo’s decisions concerning the timeliness of his trial and his competency evaluation, 
4 
 
he did not allege that the judge acted in the absence of jurisdiction.  See Figueroa v. 
Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443-44 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that “[a] judge will not be 
deprived of immunity because the action he took is in error, was done maliciously, or was 
in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in 
the clear absence of all jurisdiction”).  Because there is no question that Judge Curcillo 
acted within his jurisdiction, Richardson’s claims are barred.  See id. (“[g]enerally, . . . 
where a court has some subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient jurisdiction for 
immunity purposes”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  Additionally, the 
Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Richadson’s claim against Judge Curcillo for 
injunctive relief was also barred.  See Azubuko, 443 F.3d at 303-04 (injunctive relief 
against a judicial officer not available under § 1983 unless a declaratory decree was 
violated or declaratory relief is unavailable).   
Next, Richardson’s claims against prosecutors Canavan, Chardo, and the Dauphin 
County District Attorney’s Office are also barred by absolute immunity.  See Buckley v. 
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (“[A]cts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing 
for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his 
role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity.”).  
Richardson’s allegations indicate that both prosecutors acted entirely within the scope of 
their respective positions as they sought to bring him to trial and participated in the 
competency evaluation process.  See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 343-44 
(2009) (applying absolute immunity where the prosecutor’s administrative obligation was 
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“directly connected with the conduct of a trial”); see also Williams v. Consovoy, 453 
F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2006) (competency evaluation is “function integral to the judicial 
process”). 
Richardson’s claim of malicious prosecution also fails.  To prove a malicious 
prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must meet a number of elements, including 
that the “criminal proceeding ended in his favor.”  Allen v. N.J. State Police, 974 F.3d 
497, 502 (3d Cir. 2020).  As this Court has explained, favorable termination requires a 
showing that a conviction has been “disposed of in a way that indicates the innocence of 
the accused.”  Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2009).  Because 
Richardson’s conviction has not been overturned or otherwise favorably terminated, he 
cannot allege the elements required for malicious prosecution.  
Richardson also alleges that the prosecution violated his right to equal protection 
by prosecuting him for kidnapping while declining to prosecute the person he kidnapped.  
The Magistrate Judge correctly interpreted Richardson’s claim as an allegation of 
selective prosecution, a form of discriminatory law enforcement that violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 
(1886).  Two factors must be proved: first, that persons similarly situated were not 
prosecuted; second, “that the decision to prosecute was made based on an unjustifiable 
standard, such as race, religion or some other arbitrary factor.” United States v. 
Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1989) (per curiam).  As explained by the Magistrate 
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Judge, Richardson has failed to allege the basis for either factor and therefore has failed 
to state a claim of selective prosecution. 
Additionally, Richardson’s claims against defense counsel, including Hartye, 
Winnick, and the Dauphin County Public Defender’s Office, fail under § 1983 because 
the defendants are not state actors.  Public defenders do not act under color of state law 
for purposes of § 1983 when they “perform[] a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel 
to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”  See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 
(1981).  Although defense attorneys may act “under color of” state law when they 
conspire with state officials to deprive a person of his or her federal rights, see Tower v. 
Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984), a plaintiff pleading unconstitutional conspiracy “must 
assert facts from which a conspiratorial agreement can be inferred,” Great W. Mining & 
Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178 (3d Cir. 2010).  Richardson’s bare 
assertion that defense counsel conspired with the prosecution concerning his competency 
evaluation failed to plausibly allege any conspiracy.   
Finally, considering the foregoing, the District Court did not abuse its discretion or 
otherwise err in dismissing the complaint without leave to amend after determining that 
further amendment would have been futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 
F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.1
 
1 Richardson’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied in light of our disposition.  
See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1993). 
